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Introduction
Before the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, the vast majority of social scien-
tists were not paying much attention to the politics of central banking, despite 
the fact that, since their creation, central banks have been pivotal institutions 
between private financial institutions and public authorities (Singleton, 2010). 
During the past decades, central banks acquired considerable independence 
from public officials under the Central Bank Independence (CBI) template 
(McNamara, 2002). Governments justified their decisions to delegate monetary 
competences by relying on a narrow conception of monetary policy, in which 
central bankers should only seek to control inflation and ignore the implications 
of their policies on other economic issues such as financial stability or wealth 
inequalities (Issing et al., 2001; Marcussen, 2009). Heterodox economists and 
critical political economists opposed this view by declaring that monetary pol-
icy is fundamentally political as it deals with complicated policy trade-offs, 
which generates winners and losers (Epstein & Gintis, 1995; Forder, 2005). 
However, until 2007, their concerns were very marginal and remained at the 
fringes of the political debate. The vast majority of policy-makers, economists, 
and central bankers themselves agreed on the fact that the CBI template was 
the optimal institutional arrangement between fiscal and monetary authorities.
However, the changing role of central banks since the crisis has reversed the 
situation. Indeed, in face of the risks associated with an implosion of the finan-
cial system, central banks moved away from their traditional inflation-targeting 
framework and started to implement systemic unconventional monetary instru-
ments in order to stabilize large interconnected financial systems and, later on, 
to revive growth (Goodhart et al., 2014). For the sake of simplicity, let us say 
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of regular liquidity offers in terms of maturity, volume, and collateral range, 
on the one hand, and straight purchases of securities on secondary markets (the 
so-called Quantitative Easing (QE) programs), on the other hand. This change 
of role has inflated central banks’ balance sheets by five times for the Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) and by ten times for the Bank 
of England between 2007 and 2019 (Potter & Smets, 2019).
In addition to these changes in monetary policy, central banks have also 
obtained or gained back prudential supervisory competences, which they were 
deprived from since the end of the 1990s (McPhilemy, 2016). In the case of 
the ECB, it also exerted coercive pressures on Eurozone economic reforms 
through the conditionality of its financial interventions and its participation in 
the so-called “Troika,” which included the European Commission and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and supervises the implementation of these reforms 
(Fontan, 2018).
This shifting role led to a (re)politicization of central banking: the salience 
of monetary issues rose in the public debate, it created new political cleavages 
and new policy watchers appeared (Best, 2016; Tesche, 2019). This repolitici-
zation worries central bankers, who see it as a threat for their independence 
(Goodhart & Lastra, 2018). Indeed, when independent regulatory agencies ex-
tend the remit of their power, political authorities often seek to regain control 
and reduce their level of autonomy (Elgie, 2002). Recent examples include 
Donald Trump’s Twitter attacks against the Federal Reserve Chair, Jay Powell, 
and the German backlash against the asset purchases and the negative interest 
rates implemented by the ECB.
Conversely, central bankers try to neutralize repoliticization and these ef-
forts influence the design of their policies. In fact, independent regulatory agen-
cies often pursue “reputational strategies” in order to maintain or extend their 
level of autonomy (Carpenter, 2010). Central bankers often seek to subsume 
their new unconventional monetary tools under the pre-crisis justifications of 
their independence (Van’t Klooster & Fontan, 2019). By emphasizing continu-
ity, they keep decisions on new monetary instruments in the domain of their 
expert judgments, and thereby outside the domain of democratic politics (Hay, 
2007; Johnson et al., 2019). These strategies were successful to the extent that, 
until today, no major central bank has suffered a significant loss of indepen-
dence. In parallel, there is still a very high consensus among economists in favor 
of the status-quo (Dietsch et al., 2018: Chapter 4). However, this pretense to 
continuity obfuscates the fact that new monetary tools come with significant 
distributive consequences, whose costs might outweigh their benefits (Fontan 
et al., 2016).
In this chapter, we review how the (critical) political economy literature 
has scrutinized the evolving role of central banks this last decade and we de-
bunk central banks’ pretense to continuity. Since monetary policy has been 
successfully scientized in the last decades, this critical perspective asks to pay 
equal attention to the “real-world” monetary policy developments and to the 
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scientific debates on these developments. We remain, however, agnostic on the 
performativity of scientific knowledge on central bank operations.
We focus on two lines of criticism that are central to the inquiry developed in 
this Handbook of Critical Finance Studies.1 First, we examine how financial power 
shapes central banks’ unconventional policy to the benefit of private finance. 
Second, we review how these “high-finance” struggles affect  “low-finance,” 
that is, what are the distributive effects of post-crisis monetary policy on firms 
and households? Finally, we examine current debates on alternative monetary 
tools, which could potentially fare better than current monetary arrangements 
in distributive, ecological, and democratic terms.
In what follows, we analyze the pre-crisis CBI template that informs the 
practices and rhetoric of central bankers to this day (“The Era of CBI”) and the 
heterodox criticism against this model (“The Heterodox Criticism of CBI”). 
Then, we explain how financial power shapes central banks’ unconventional 
monetary operations (“Financial Power”), outline the distributive implications 
of unconventional monetary policies (“The Distributive Dimension of Uncon-
ventional Monetary Policy”), and expose debates on future monetary arrange-
ments (“After the Crisis: Which Alternative Monetary Policy Instruments?”).
The Era of CBI
Central banks are public institutions that have the monopoly over the issuance 
of legal tender. They are not the sole creators of money: the greatest part of the 
money supply is made of the sum of all credits issued by private banks (McLeay 
et al., 2014). However, central banks’ money has a special privilege that makes 
them pivotal regulatory institutions within the state-finance nexus: all other 
kinds of money are promises redeemable in central banks’ money (Pistor, 2013). 
This privilege gives central banks the capacity to achieve two policy objectives 
that are crucial for the functioning of financialized capitalist systems: price sta-
bility and financial stability (Goodhart, 2011).
While these two objectives remained constant throughout their history, 
central banks were also assigned other roles, which fluctuate in time and space. 
For example, the US Federal Reserve is tasked with the mission of pursuing 
full employment. Some central banks, especially in non-Western countries, aim 
at maintaining a stable exchange rate and support national developmental pol-
icies (Campiglio et al., 2018). In the same vein, Western central banks were 
also backing up domestic credit policies in the aftermath of the Second World 
War until the advent of the CBI era (Monnet, 2018). Historically, the extent of 
objectives granted to central banks is correlated with their degree of indepen-
dence: the higher the degree of independence of central banks, the smaller their 
set of goals, and vice versa.
The CBI template swept around the world in the late 1980s. Its main prem-
ises were that central banks should remain politically independent and that 
their main task was to maintain low inflation. The theoretical sources of CBI 
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are rooted in the context of the inflationary 1970s in industrialized countries. 
Since established Keynesian theories seemed unable to explain the inflationary 
pressures of the time (De Vroey, 2016), other schools of thought started to 
gain preeminence in the macro-economic debate. The so-called new classical 
macroeconomics were very influential in the build-up of the CBI template 
(Barro & Gordon, 1983; Kydland & Prescott, 1977; Lucas, 1972). The core issue 
identified by these theories is the “time-inconsistency problem,” which relates 
to the lack of credibility of elected officials when they announce that they are 
committed to fight inflation. Since market participants believe that elected offi-
cials cannot resist manipulating the money supply, they adapt their expectations 
and price future inflation in their investment decisions, which, in turn, generate 
inflation pressures.
The policy upshot is to reinforce the credibility of central banks’ a nti- 
inflationary stance by isolating them from political pressures and removing in-
centives that might distract them from their price stability objective. Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) proposed to adopt strict monetary rules to anchor credibil-
ity, but their proposal was quickly dismissed following rule-based policy failures 
(Kaldor, 1985). Rogoff’s (1985) proposal was much more successful because it 
made anti-inflationary credibility compatible with flexible  policy-making. His 
solution consists in appointing a “conservative” central banker who is signifi-
cantly more biased against inflation than other policy-makers are, so as to min-
imize the risk of letting central banks engage in expansionary and inflationary 
policies.
The CBI template constitutes an important exemption to the majoritarian 
rule in liberal democracies. According to its proponents, its legitimacy depends 
on two important features. The first feature is that central banks have only one 
policy objective: price stability, and one tool to achieve it: the setting of short-
term interest rates. That goal is “narrow”: it does not require policy measures 
beyond the technical operations required to reach the inflation target. Second, 
that goal can easily be operationalized and monitored by tracking changes in 
the price index. Low inflation can, therefore, serve as an objective and narrow 
guide for central banks’ actions. In practice, from the 1980s onward, the vast 
majority of central banks converged on a very similar pattern of practices to 
reach their objectives (Borio, 2011). In the pre-2007 era, central banks usually 
determined a target rate, and then aimed at maintaining that rate thanks to 
open market operations (OMO), in which liquidity is provided in the form 
of central banks reserves to commercial banks at a certain interest rate against 
collateral for a short time. In that framework, central banks have only an indi-
rect influence on real economic variables: private banks form the channels of 
transmission of central bank monetary policy and allocate credit to households 
and firms.
The second feature that justifies the CBI framework is that the pursuit of 
price stability by central banks does not have major distributive consequences 
(Ingham, 2004). This implies that central bankers can treat monetary policy 
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as “neutral,” in at least two senses. First, in line with what monetarists have 
claimed since the 1960s (Friedman, 1968), most central bankers generally ad-
here to the view that monetary policy does not have any long-term effect on 
macroeconomic variables, except for inflation. Changes in “real” variables (such 
as worker productivity) affect the economy in the long run, but “monetary” 
variables do not. Hence, price stability was considered as a precondition for the 
successful pursuit of other objectives rather than a variable that can be manipu-
lated for distributive purposes. Second, OMOs were supposed to have a neutral 
impact on the relative prices of financial assets and, thus, to avoid interferences 
in the price formation process among market participants (market neutrality).
In sum, under the CBI template, central bank operations were broadly per-
ceived as apolitical (Marcussen, 2009); the goal to attain was narrow and con-
sensual and the technical means to achieve it unproblematic. Crucially, this 
perception also forms the justifications for the very high level of independence 
given to central bankers.
The Heterodox Criticism of CBI
Against this consensus, heterodox scholars constantly claimed that monetary 
policy is utterly political and they tried to debunk the myths underlying the 
CBI framework (Aglietta & Orléan, 1998).
First, even if the aims of monetary policy are narrow, fulfilling these aims 
give rise to important trade-offs (Forder, 1998). For instance, the aims of 
price stability and full-employment often come at odds with each other, as 
fast-growing economic systems may generate inflationary pressures. Moreover, 
the beneficial nature of price stability cannot be assessed in isolation from other 
economic phenomena or from outside specific political contexts. For instance, 
in the post-war period, West Germany experienced both low inflation and 
low unemployment rates thanks to its economic model based on good export 
competitiveness and strong institutional coordination between the Bundesbank 
and powerful trade unions (Hall & Franzese, 1998). However, following the 
creation of the Eurozone, the imitation of the German price stability model was 
less beneficial for other European countries where wage coordination and ex-
port performance are weaker (e.g., Spain, Italy, France, Greece, and Portugal).
Second, monetary policy, even before 2007, has distributional effects. Indeed, 
low inflation tends to benefit creditors, at the expense of debtors. Compared to 
other groups, owners of financial assets have benefited from a disproportion-
ate increase in their wealth since the early 1980s, which marked the starting 
point of the financialization of the economy (Epstein, 2005). This is the re-
sult of financial deregulation and high real interest rates, which stemmed from 
conservative inflation-targeting monetary policies. Some central bankers have 
acknowledged that monetary policy can generate these distributional impacts 
(Fontan et al., 2016: 15). However, they generally dismiss the relevance of these 
effects by framing them as the unintended, small, and unavoidable consequences 
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of monetary policy, which, according to them, could be addressed with fiscal 
policy (Fontan et al., 2016: 16–17).
Third, the independence of central banks from political actors does not 
mean that central banks are independent from financial markets. Indeed, the 
financialization of the economy, which has accelerated since the 1980s, meant 
that financial intermediaries (on financial intermediaries, see also the chapter by 
Tadjeddine in this Handbook) raised in importance and gained increased powers 
to influence their regulators, including central bankers. Adolph’s (2013) seminal 
research documents several cases of former central bankers moving to private 
institutions at the end of their careers, or of private bankers getting appointed 
in high-profile positions in central banks. The troubling conclusion is that those 
passing through these revolving doors are more likely to take decisions in favor 
of the private financial sector, which amplifies the risks of “regulatory capture.”
In short, from the 1990s until the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the CBI frame-
work reigned (almost) unchallenged. The overall consensus was that central 
banking was mostly concerned about technicalities, and that its main purpose 
was to maintain low inflation. It was believed that the financialization of the 
economy was conducive to financial stability and that monetary policy had no 
effect on the distribution of wealth and income. However, the next two sections 
show that the 2007 financial crisis has put a serious blow to these conceptions 
and has shaken the pre-crisis consensus. In fact, the discrepancy between the 
stability of the CBI paradigm and the changing role of central banks since the 
crisis is a major research agenda for critical finance studies.
Financial Power
The CBI framework might have successfully isolated central bankers from po-
litical pressures but failed at identifying another source of influence: financial 
power. Beyond the issue of regulatory capture (cf. the previous section), schol-
ars have identified two sources of power wielded by the financial sector over 
central banks: (1) structural power and (2) infrastructural power.
Financial structural power derives from the central role played by financial in-
stitutions in our economies (Culpepper & Reinke, 2014). When banks become 
too-big-to-fail (TBTF) during the financialization process, it is much more likely 
that public authorities will bail them out in the case of financial difficulties (Woll, 
2014). The awareness that policymakers’ hands are tied creates a problem of moral 
hazard, since banks have an incentive to grow to the point that they become 
TBTF. In fact, Federal Reserve insiders acknowledged in 2004 that reputational 
and economic costs linked to the failure of a TBTF institution would be so high 
that they would have no choice but to bail out insolvent banks, even though it 
would trigger a moral hazard problem (Stern & Feldman, 2004).
Arguably, the liquidity offered to insolvent institutions in the early stages of 
the crisis and the systemic unconventional monetary tools implemented later 
on confirmed that, when central banks are faced with a trade-off between 
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short-term financial stability and long-term financial stability, they tend to fa-
vor the former ( Jacobs & King, 2016; Kalaitzake, 2019). In turn, these inter-
ventions transformed central banks into “bad banks,” to the extent that they 
swapped liquidity against risky assets previously owned by commercial banks 
(Cour-Thimann, 2013). Moreover, banks did not use this favorable situation to 
recapitalize and consolidate their balance-sheets to be more resilient when the 
next financial crisis hits (Brunnermeier & Sannikov, 2016). Rather, the dis-
crepancy between the post-crisis weak economic growth and market euphoria 
suggests that financial operators did not make any fundamental changes to their 
risky behaviors (Admati & Hellwig, 2014; Turner, 2016).
Considering that the economic and social consequences of the 2007 market 
meltdown would have been more severe without the swiftness and the scope of 
central bank interventions, moral hazard could be considered as a small price 
to pay (Eichengreen, 2014). However, in this case, we would expect central 
bankers and other political authorities to support stricter financial regulation 
and deleveraging of the financial sector to prevent similar scenarios in the fu-
ture. Yet, financial regulation reforms did not meaningfully limit the problem-
atic financial activities that led to the crisis (Helleiner, 2014; Thiemann et al., 
2018). The first research results on the role played by central banks in these 
reforms show that, far from advocating stricter rules, they have advocated fur-
ther financialization of the banking sector (Conti-Brown, 2016: 160; Gabor & 
 Vestergaard, 2018; Kalaitzake, 2019). We argue that financial structural power 
partly explains this regulatory neglect.
Commercial banks wield infrastructural power, i.e., they exert control over the 
transmission channels of monetary policy (Braun, 2018). In the words of Braun, 
these channels of transmission are “infrastructural entanglements” which makes 
central bankers dependent on bankers to steer the economy. Scholars have ex-
plored how central banks’ depoliticization strategies ignited commercial banks’ 
infrastructural power before the crisis on both sides of the Atlantic (Braun, 
2018; Krippner, 2012; Walter & Wansleben, 2019). Now, they study how this 
leverage led to the protection and promotion of problematic market activities by 
central bankers and their lack of control over the use of the liquidity provided 
to financial operators since the crisis.
After Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, the Fed, the BoE, and the ECB injected 
massive amounts of liquidity to stabilize problematic segments of financial mar-
kets propelled by the 1990s financial innovation and deregulation, such as repo 
and securitization markets (Braun, 2016; Gabor & Ban, 2016; Krippner, 2012). 
In fact, since the crisis, central banks became “market-makers of last-resort”: 
they now provide safe assets to market participants who use them as collateral 
in repo market operations (Mehrling, 2010).2 Moreover, the ECB came to rely 
so much on the smooth functioning of repo markets for the transmission of its 
monetary policy that it successfully opposed their inclusion into the EU finan-
cial transactions’ tax proposal (Gabor, 2016; Kalaitzake, 2017). Moreover, the 
ECB and the BoE have also been at the forefront of the EU authorities’ efforts 
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to revive securitization markets under the Capital Market Union proposal (see 
Competition and Change, special issue 2018, 22(2)). In other words, central bank-
ers have actively defended and promoted problematic market activities that led 
to the crisis because the transmission of their monetary policy came to rely on 
their smooth functioning.
The issue is that there is a huge discrepancy between the amounts of liquid-
ity injected by central banks in the financial markets and their impact on eco-
nomic performance (Turner, 2016). This is because commercial banks exploit 
their leverage to use the liquidity provided by central banks for purposes other 
than providing credit to economic agents (such as either investing in exiting 
assets or derivatives or engaging in share buybacks). Political economy research 
on the conditionality attached to monetary instruments has shown that central 
bankers fail to control the use of their liquidity (Dietsch et al., 2018: Chapter 
3). For example, as no conditionality was attached to the initial ECB Long-
Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), banks engaged in trade activities that 
are problematic from the point of view of central bank policy objectives: they 
borrowed liquidity at 1% to purchase risk-free sovereign bonds with higher in-
terest rates and pocketed the difference. When some form of conditionality on 
the use of liquidity was introduced (Targeted (T)LTRO), banks were reluctant 
to participate in these operations, and the ECB quickly gave up its attempt to 
control the use of its liquidity (Fontan, 2018).
In the same vein, the latest ECB monetary policy innovation combines TL-
TRO with the creation of a two-tier system3 on bank reserves. This allows 
“dual interest rates” in which central banks set an interest rate for bank lending, 
which is lower than the interest rate paid by banks on their reserves held at the 
central bank. Hence, “dual interest rates” raise the net interest income of the 
private financial sector: the ECB “pays” banks to pursue lending (Mackintosh, 
2019). Like with its other unconventional tools, the ECB justifies these very 
generous conditions for the private banking sector with the argument that such 
advantages are necessary to incentivize banks to lend more to firms and house-
holds (European Central Bank, 2019).
In sum, isolating central banks from political pressures does not solve the 
issue of their independence towards financial market interests. Quite the con-
trary, the answer of independent central banks to the financial crisis has ex-
posed that their policies are, at least to some extent, influenced by the structural 
and infrastructural power wielded by financial institutions. Studying financial 
power over central banks offers vibrant research perspectives to analyze recent 
developments within the state-high finance nexus (Strange, 1986). Moreover, 
since the crisis, central banks became key policy actors in national and su-
pranational financial reforms thanks to their epistemic authority (Omarova, 
2018). From this perspective, analyzing their research production on financial 
regulation might add a new piece to the puzzle of lackluster post-crisis finan-
cial regulation (on financial regulation, see also the chapter by Coombs in this 
Handbook).
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The Distributive Dimension of Unconventional Monetary Policy
The analysis of financial power sheds lights on how central bank operations 
are impacted by the preferences of market players in the high finance circles. 
Studying the distributive effects of central banks’ unconventional policies helps 
to understand how financial power impacts low finance, that is, wealth distribu-
tion at the household/firms level. In fact, the criticism addressed by heterodox 
scholars against the “neutral monetary policy” assumption underlying the CBI 
framework (cf. “The Heterodox Criticism of CBI” section) must be renewed 
in line with the shift in the instrumentation of monetary policy since the cri-
sis. While we know that the bias displayed by conservative central bankers in 
favor of price stability has advantaged the owners of financial capital over other 
economic agents, does unconventional monetary policy generate winners and 
losers?
Central bankers claim that their asset purchase programs do not have sig-
nificant distributive effects. In fact, they recognize that their purchases have 
direct inegalitarian effects: when central banks purchase sovereign bonds, this 
pushes up the value of those bonds – and affects other market segments too as it 
fosters demand for corporate bonds and equities. Since the households that hold 
financial assets are concentrated at the top end of the wealth distribution, asset 
purchases make rich people even richer (Bell et al., 2012). However, central 
bankers claim that this is not the end of the story just yet. Asset purchases also 
trigger indirect effects: they help to revive growth and, thus, boost employment 
and wages, which mostly help the modest households. In turn, the combined 
effects of direct and indirect channels on households’ wealth depend on the 
composition and the distribution of financial assets and debts among households 
(Colciago et al., 2019: 23).
ECB economists claim that, in the case of asset purchases conducted in the 
Eurozone since 2015, indirect effects outweigh direct effects and they conclude 
that ECB asset purchases have actually decreased wealth inequality (Ampu-
dia et al., 2018: 33; Lenza & Slacalek, 2018). Can we trust this in-house ECB 
research and extrapolate that, in general, asset purchases have helped to de-
crease inequalities? Since these are the only studies (to our knowledge) to make 
such strong claim on the egalitarian effects of asset purchases, it is important 
to discuss them to make our larger point about the distributive dimension of 
unconventional monetary policy. Fontan et al. (2019) found four reasons to be 
doubtful about these results, and we introduce a fifth argument, which tackles 
the market neutrality issue.
First, a recent literature review of the Heterogeneous Agents New Keynes-
ian (HANK) models4 gives a much more nuanced view than the research pro-
duced by the ECB (Colciago et al., 2019). After identifying four direct channels 
of transmission of unconventional tools and two indirect ones, this literature 
review notices that most of the research has considered these channels in iso-
lation and that the research results of these studies contradict each other. The 
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authors conclude that the existing empirical evidence on the distributive ef-
fects of monetary policy is mixed: effects vary according to the channel under 
study, the examined monetary tool, and the economic structure of the country 
and households. In other words, contrary to the conclusions of the ECB re-
searchers who considers only two channels of distribution, it is impossible to 
estimate precisely the distributive effects of unconventional monetary policy 
until HANK models incorporate direct and indirect channels of transmission 
of monetary policy simultaneously rather than in isolation.
Second, there are solid reasons to have doubts about the capacity of HANK 
models to deliver robust estimations of the distributive effects of unconven-
tional monetary policy. Indeed, the distinction between direct and indirect 
effects indicates that the former is easier to measure than the latter. While direct 
effects have, without doubt, inflated financial asset prices, causal links between 
asset purchases and the stimulation of economic growth are much harder to 
track down. For example, a recent study has shown that the identification strat-
egy used in Lenza & Slacalek (2018) is invalid (Elbourne & Ji, 2019). Indeed, 
these authors have substituted the values attached to the ECB monetary policy 
in the model by random numbers but reached similar results. If macroeconomic 
changes associated with monetary policy were robust, results with random 
numbers should have been different from the ones used in the ECB’s studies.
Third, the measurement of wealth inequalities is problematic. For example, 
by using the national wealth-to-national income ratio as a proxy for wealth 
inequalities rather than the Gini index,5 Fuller et al. (2019) found that rising 
house prices, which is an effect of asset purchases, has inegalitarian effects. By 
contrast, in conventional central banks models, it is assumed that rising house 
prices help to decrease wealth inequalities, which are measured with the Gini 
index. Moreover, the measurement of inequalities in the monetary economics 
literature does not really correspond to common perceptions of inequalities. 
This discrepancy is exemplified in the left panel of Figure 7.1, which replicates 
a simulation of the impact of ECB purchases on wealth inequalities (Ampudia 
et al., 2018: fig. 4).
According to the authors, the fact that the lowest quintile experiences the 
fastest wealth growth in percentage among the whole population is an indicator 
of the egalitarian effects of asset purchases. Yet, the representation of the data 
in percentage hides huge disparities of variation in monetary values. The right 
panel of Figure 7.1 shows it well: 2.5% of 1,100€ barely amounts to 30€ of ad-
ditional wealth for the poorest quintile while the median wealth for the richest 
quintile is augmented by more than 5,000€. While these evolutions would be 
associated with a slight decline in the Gini index, it would take more than 350 
years for the net rise in median income of the lowest quintile to exceed the 
higher quintile.
Fourth, this study and other central banks’ researchers do not consider alter-
native counterfactual scenarios seriously enough. While central bankers often 
repeat that asset purchases might have inegalitarian effects, they underline that 
 EBSCOhost - printed on 9/22/2020 4:46 AM via UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
























































 EBSCOhost - printed on 9/22/2020 4:46 AM via UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
Central Banking
165
the lack of implementation of these instruments would have brought even worst 
distributive outcomes since poor households suffer the most during recessions 
(Fontan et al., 2016: 18). Asset purchases were arguably a better policy option 
than doing nothing. However, it does not preclude alternative monetary tools 
that would fare better than QE in distributive or environmental terms. We turn 
to these alternatives in our next and last section.
Last but not least, central banks do not only purchase sovereign bonds: many 
of them intervene now on corporate securities markets6 (Van’t Klooster & Fon-
tan, 2019). Central bankers claim that these interventions are “market neutral,” 
that is, they do not distort relative prices of financial assets. To implement mar-
ket neutrality, central bankers mirror investment funds’ business models as they 
follow a passive neutral strategy, which consists in purchasing a basket of secu-
rities that is representative of the market universe. While central bankers seem 
to be successful in not distorting prices within the corporate securities markets, 
their purchases create clear winners and losers. Winners include the firms with 
a large exposure to the corporate securities markets whose securities are directly 
purchased by central banks, that is, big multinational firms with a large carbon 
footprint (Matikainen et al., 2017). Conversely, losers are small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), which do not have the financial capacities to emit bonds.
In sum, unconventional monetary policies have distributive consequences. 
While it is still difficult to identify winners and losers of these policies, prelim-
inary research indicates that owners of financial assets and multinational firms 
with a large carbon footprint are part of the former group while households and 
SMEs are part of the latter group. In the light of these indications, it is easy to 
understand why central bankers fear for their legitimacy. However, rather than 
trying to hide these facts by claiming that their interventions are neutral, cen-
tral bankers should acknowledge these inescapable consequences and look for 
policy instruments that could deliver better outcomes.
After the Crisis: Which Alternative Monetary  
Policy Instruments?
In this section, we review several alternative instruments that, according to 
their proponents, might weaken financial power and lead to better distributive 
outcomes. Most notably, these proposals illustrate how the current framework 
within which central banks navigate might have become obsolete.
One of them is the so-called “helicopter money” proposal, in which central 
banks would credit citizens’ account directly, rather than going through financial 
intermediaries. Born as a thought experiment by Milton Friedman (1968), the 
idea was later revived by NGOs and left-wing elected officials in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis. Muellbauer (2014), an academic and think-tank re-
searcher, argues in favor of providing “all workers and pensioners” with a 500€ 
payment from the ECB, using their social security number or the electoral regis-
ter to identify them. In the non-academic world, this policy has sometimes been 
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called “QE for the people” to highlight its appeal in comparison with the QE 
programs in the United States and Europe (e.g., van Lerven, 2016).
The main rationale given to that proposal (Blyth & Lonergan, 2014; Buiter, 
2014; Muellbauer, 2014) is that, in economies suffering from a lack of spending, 
giving money directly to people (instead of buying bonds) would help to revive 
growth or help stop a recession. According to Muellbauer (2014), this effect is 
expected to be larger in economies where people are relatively more cash-poor 
(e.g., Portugal or Spain) than in economies, such as Germany, where people 
have already constituted large amounts of savings.
The helicopter money proposal suggests that, for central banks to have sig-
nificant effects on the post-crisis economy, they might need to get rid of the 
CBI framework and the regular channels of transmission of monetary policy. 
However, with helicopter money, private banks would still hold a central place 
within the financial system, since money would be credited on citizens’ bank 
accounts. As the 2007–2008 financial crisis has shown, the important weight 
of private banks in the economy creates a moral hazard problem and helicop-
ter money would not help to decrease financial power (see “Financial Power” 
section).
Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) could provide a useful tool for 
central banks to bypass the private sector while allowing them to implement 
unconventional monetary policies, such as the helicopter money proposal. In 
fact, today, central bankers seriously consider implementing CBDC. CBDC 
would be labeled in a national currency (euro, dollar, sterling pound…) and 
would, in most scenarios, amount to giving access to central bank balance sheet 
to a larger public (Barrdear & Kumhof, 2016; Bordo & Levin, 2017; Broad-
bent, 2016; Dyson & Hodgson, 2016). In practice, each citizen would have 
an account, labeled in CBDC, either directly at the central bank or indirectly 
through specific agencies. In any case, the money would stay at the central 
bank, and be legally its money, even if accredited financial intermediaries could 
provide access to these accounts to the public. Citizens and firms would be able 
to exchange their money held in cash or on their bank account against CBDC.
The implementation of CBDC on a large scale has the potential to reduce 
dramatically financial power. Contrary to the “simple” helicopter money pro-
posal, CBDC would allow central banks to credit citizens’ accounts directly 
without necessarily resorting to banking intermediaries (Engert & Fung, 2017: 
6). CBDC could also help alleviate financial structural power, by making pri-
vate banks less vital for the economy. Citizens could opt for holding their sav-
ings on central banks’ accounts, which, by definition, would be much safer than 
commercial banks’ accounts (Broadbent, 2016; Dyson & Hodgson, 2016: 9–10). 
Moreover, the introduction of CBDC would decrease banks’ infrastructural 
power by offering an alternative payment system that is not managed by the 
private banking sector.
Both proposals would be in line with the dynamics unfolding in central 
banking since the 2007 financial crisis. In short, these dynamics have consisted 
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in giving greater powers to central banks while looking for ways to circumvent 
the damaging effects of financial power. Yet, the increased powers of central 
banks have not come with stricter political controls (Adolph, 2018; Högenauer & 
Howarth, 2016; Jones & Matthijs, 2019). Without significant changes in the 
current central banking framework, the helicopter money and CBDC proposals 
would aggravate this problem: central bankers would have access to household 
and firms financial data, and they would take decisions with even more pro-
found distributive consequences than current unconventional monetary policy.
One way forward to increase their legitimacy would be to adapt their man-
date, by putting more weight on the distributional or environmental impact 
of their (unconventional) policies (Fontan et al., 2016; Van’t Klooster, 2018). 
Alternatively, greater cooperation between monetary and fiscal authorities does 
not necessarily involve mandate change: central banks could increase their pur-
chases of public investment banks, respect ethical or environmental criteria de-
fined by the parliament when purchasing bonds, or form tier committees with 
fiscal authorities to set allocative targets (Ryan-Collins & Van Lerven, 2018). 
From this perspective, the current central banks’ frameworks in South-East 
Asia and the former mandates of Western central banks during the 1950s offer 
glimpses of how monetary policy could contribute more directly to the fight 
against climate change and inequalities (Campiglio et al., 2018; Monnet, 2018).
Concluding Remarks
Between the 1990s and the 2007–2008 financial crisis, central banking followed 
a specific template, which, by historical standards, has narrowed down the ob-
jectives of monetary policy to price stability and isolated central banks from po-
litical pressures to an unprecedented degree (Singleton, 2010). While heterodox 
scholars maintained that central banks were inherently political institutions, 
the CBI template reached a very high level of consensus among p olicy-makers 
and economists and it led to an effective depoliticization of monetary issues 
(Marcussen, 2009). The 2007 financial crisis changed this state of affairs, since it 
fragilized central assumptions of the CBI model (such as the neglect of financial 
stability). Moreover, the unconventional monetary instruments implemented 
by central banks have been much more controversial than the regular pre-2007 
interest rates policies (Goodhart et al., 2014).
In this chapter, we have identified two critical research agendas, which offer 
stimulating perspectives on how to grasp the power dynamics at play in this 
new era of central banking. On the one hand, there is a new stream of political 
economy literature, which untangles the state-finance nexus by analyzing the 
role played by central banks in the stabilization of hypertrophied and fragile 
financial systems. This analysis of “high finance” power games reveals that pri-
vate banks were able to wield structural and infrastructural power over central 
banks and, thus, have influenced the formulation of unconventional monetary 
policy in their favor.
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On the other hand, to understand how these “high finance” power struggles 
impact “low finance,” we have reviewed the most recent macro-economic re-
search on the distributive implications of asset purchases. While acknowledging 
the mixed empirical results of this stream of research, we are very critical of the 
in-house ECB research claiming that asset purchases have helped to decrease in-
equalities. On the contrary, rich households and multinational firms with large 
carbon footprint seem to be the obvious winners of unconventional policies, 
while gains by poorer households and SMEs are less obvious.
Finally, in the light of all the drawbacks of the unconventional monetary 
policy developed under the CBI framework, we have explored two potential 
reforms that are gaining traction in the public debate: helicopter money and 
CBDC. These proposals have an obvious ethical appeal but they could reinforce 
the unchecked gain of power of central banks since the crisis. In sum, future 
research in critical finance studies should pay specific attention to the widening 
gap between the gain of new powers by central bankers and their resilient high 
level of protection against political interferences.
Notes
 1 In this chapter, we had to exclude other significant topics of interest on central 
banking. Yet, we encourage readers to pay attention to the international dimension 
of the monetary system, which is fraught by the discretionary politics of the Federal 
Reserve (Sahasrabuddhe, 2019) or to the ideational research aiming at opening the 
“black-box” of central banks’ decision-making (Ferrara, 2019; Golub et al., 2015).
 2 This evolving role mirrors the changing structure of financial systems where 
 collateral-based repo operations became the main source of financing for banks and 
other financial intermediaries (Gabor, 2016).
 3 A two-tier system exempts part of commercial banks reserves held at the central 
bank from negative rates.
 4 HANK models differ from the Representative Agents New Keynesian (RANK) 
models that were used before the crisis in that they allow modeling various con-
sumption responses of households to monetary policy changes (Kaplan et al., 2018).
 5 The Gini index is the most common measure to track wealth inequality.
 6 The ECB, the Bank of England, and the Swiss National Bank are three good 
examples.
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